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THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIMENSION OF
PHENOMENOLOGY
SEBASTIAN LUFT

This short text to follow is an attempt at philosophizing "free-style"; an
attempt, that is, which does not concern itself with much recourse to primary or
secondary literature. Hence, references to texts by the philosophers mentioned
here are kept to a minimum. The purpose of this text, instead, is to initiate a
"fundamental reflection", as one could call it, on the nature of phenomenology.
May the reader indulge me in this free-styling activity, and I would welcome
equally unburdened responses.

It is a long-standing discussion within phenomenology and without, what this
allegedly new discipline, inaugurated by Edmund Husser! over a century ago,
really stands for. In other words, what are its various types of "commitments", as
one calls it today, ontological, epistemological, metaphysical? It seems as if there
was, and is, little agreement on what these are. 1 Hence, phenomenology threatens
to become a label, a catch phrase, an umbrella term under which all kinds of different tendencies can be placed. While I am all for individual freedom on the part
of these diverse researchers, it is not very helpful for the way phenomenology is
perceived by other philosophical schools and movements. So, what really is phenomenology? In trying to answer this question, I am speaking "from the inside"

1

Already from the onset of the Phenomenological Movement, there was a significant disagreement over the meaning of phenomenology. I cannot recapitulate these discussions, but
point especially to the work of the late Kad Schuhmann, who has unearthed the early history of
this movement. See esp. his Selected Papers in Phenomenologr (C. Leijenhorst & P. Steenbakkers, eds.,
Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2004), see here also the bibliography of his writings, ibid.
pp 355 ff.
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of phenomenology, as somebody who systematically takes phenomenology serious and thinks there is a lasting truth to it.
Instead of commenting on these commitments that phenomenologists adhere to, what I would like to do here is spell out what, I think (or at least hope),
phenomenology is in a way that all of those working in phenomenology should
be able to agree. I am offering, as it were, an eidetic variation on phenomenology
itself and will try to formulate what I take to be the real nature of phenomenology--or, for that matter, what it ought to be. In so doing, I realize I will probably
not get everybody to agree with me at the end of the day, despite my hope to the
contrary. It was already a tremendous frustration to the founding father, Husser!,
that the people working in this increasingly influential movement could not agree
oc the simplest and most basic paradigms underpinning their work He supposedly once pointed to everyone around him (all pupils) and said: ''Enemies!
Enemies! Enemies! - But above all--phenomenology ("Feinde! Feinde! Feinde!
Aber uber al/em- die Phanomenologle T'. 2 He was even more frustrated that his move
towards phenomenology as a transcendental enterprise was not seen as a logical
continuation of his work, and that is, of phenomenology as such, but as an aberration, a mistake, a self-misunderstanding.
It is precisely this notion of "transcendental" that I want to explore in the
following. To state my opinion, which is at the same time the thesis of this paper,
right at the outset: I think that Husser! was right to make the move to frame
phenomenology as a transcendental discipline. And, I think that to this day, there
exists a fundamental misunderstanding as to what Husser] means with this word,
taken of course from Kant, but certainly modified, thereby giving it an original
new mearung.
This misunderstanding is entertained on the part of phenomenology's critics,
to be sure, but also by some working in the phenomenological tradition itself.
Especially when reading some philosophers from the so-called "analytic" tradition, one gets the impression that there seems to exist a knee-jerk reaction to this
term. It is as if one desperately needs to find new -isms in order not to utter this
dirty word; as if new terms are of help instead of, as I believe, making a fairly
simple, but fundamentally important, matter unnecessarily complicated. Now,
instead of taking on the phenomenological "realists" or "anti-transcendentalists"
directly, what I would like to do in what is to come is to do simple phenomenological work: show, not argue. I hope to unfold what I here call the "transcendental
dimension" of phenomenology and hope that at the end I will have achieved two

2

This anecdote is reported by Roman Ingarden.
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tasks: firstly, to show those, who might not know what this dlmension consists
in, what it is; and secondly, to convince those who might not agree with me initially that there is such a transcendental dimension, that it is nothing to be afraid
of but instead something that can be accepted without reservation and without
having to change one's commitments mentioned above, whatever they may be.
This is not to say that my attempt to embrace all those working in phenomenology will be successful. My conciliatory attempt might in the end prompt critique,
which I welcome. Hence, if my accormt strikes some as provocative, more provocative than it actually sormds, I will also see my efforts vindicated.

***
A simple defmition of what phenomenology does is repeated again and again,
and not without good reason, in any introduction, even those written by the
founders themselves (e.g., Husser! or Heidegger): {!I den Sachen selbst!, which is
translated as to the matters themselves! (The translation as "things" in English is
somewhat misleading. ".Matters" is more adequate, as is the Spanish "cosas'',
though I will switch between both English terms.) But of course, the question
immediately follows: what are these matters? What are they not, or what does not
count as such a matter with which phenomenologists occupy themselves? And
why would any other philosopher not want to get at the matters themselves, as
one also says: medias in res? What is peculiar about phenomenology's insistence on
getting to the matters themselves? If it is more than a mere triviality, the meaning
of these "matters" is crucial for rmderstanding what phenomenology wants.
Indeed, while I do believe that what phenomenology tries to accomplish is
something very peculiar, it would be preposterous to claim that all of it is entirely
new. The call to the matters themselves is the simple attempt to get to the matters as thry real/y are, not as one thinks they might be. It is, in this sense, the move
that was already thematized in Ancient Greek philosophy from dOxa, mere opinion, to epistime, a scientific accormt that precisely does not include opinions, if we
mean by opinion unchecked and unreflected judgments that one has taken over
naively from others. Phenomenology, thus, attempts to revitalize and resuscitate
the old sense of science, and ultimately even that of rigorous science: the truly
scientific stance is reached when all opinions, biases, presuppositions have been
abandoned This is not a sacrifice, but a freeing oneself of one's old beliefs that
dominated our worldview in the "cave." Hence, phenomenology is, first of all a
resuscitation of the age-old ideal of a presuppositionless science, or it is the ideal
of total presuppositionlessness, and I say deliberately "ideal." For it could turn
out that such a stance is ultimately unattainable, that it is impossible to rid oneself
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of all presuppositions, that presuppositions in fact underpin every utterance, that
every judgment (Urtei~ rests on a presupposition (Vor-Urtei~, as Gadamer has
argued But this insight is nothing but the overcoming of the ultimate presupposition: the presupposition of presuppositionlessness. In this sense, hermeneutics
is a continuation of the ideal of "rigorous science." But this just as an aside.
So phenomenology, too, ftrst of all begins by ridding oneself of the old
presuppositions. Or to say it more cautiously, it brackets them for the time being.
It leaves open the possibility that some of them, if examined, turn out to be correct. This bracketing is the famous epoche that Husserl talks about: it is a temporary bracketing of those opinions and judgments that we make during the time
we are not doing science, whichever science this may be, biology, psychology,
anthropology or even philosophy. So the epoche is something that all people do
who somehow try to wrest themselves from ordinary, everyday opinions and try
to figure out how things "really are," even if the things might be these ordinary
opinions themselves. Again in Husserlian terms, atry scientist distances oneself
from the natural attitude, which is the natural stance of our everyday lives, a stance
to which all of us return the moment we exit the office or laboratory and order a
Cuba Libre in a cafe.
But here, the parallel with other sciences ends. For normal sciences study the
matters peculiar to them with a certain, well defined interest. For instance, the biologist studies matters with respect to them as living things. This is why for him
or her, stones or cars are not of interest, unless one day we come to use biotechnology in automobile engineering. Hence, sciences study the matters specific to
them as this or that (living, non-living, historical, musical, artistic etc.). Hence,
they do not study the matters as matters, but with a certain interest as X, Y or Z.
They precisely do not study them, in other words, the way they are meant in the
natural attitude.
And this is where the meaning of the phrase "the matters themselves" phenomenology is after can come into play again. Phenomenology, as opposed to all
other sciences, studies these matters as thry are themselves, as such, or to say it differently, as thry are in the natural attitude. Hence, phenomenology does not study specific matters (e.g., flowers) with a specific interest (as botanist, to stay with the
example), whereby the scientist necessarily has to restrict him- or herself to these
matters. Instead, phenomenology studies in principle all matters as thry are in themselves, and that is, as they are in the natural attitude, all of them, whatever they may
be. There is no limit to the matters of the natural attitude. The natural attitude is
no region, in other words, like in the sciences, where a regionalization is necessary
(the region of living matter, organic, inorganic etc.), and where progress can be
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sometimes measured in further refinement of regionalization. 3 The natural attitude is the stance from which we experience the world as meaningful to us in our
everyday living. This is the meaning of the world as !ifeworld. Hence, while all sciences depart from the natural attitude and must necessarily do so, phenomenology
t11rns back on this natural attitude itself and studies it. This is what makes phenomenology different from all other sciences and constitutes a unique enterprise
never embarked upon before.
And here, a curious reversal takes place. I said above that science marks the
difference from matters are they appear to how they rea!fy are. But if phenomenology studies matters in the natural attitude, wouldn't it then mean that it studies
them as they appear? How can this be scientific? Was not the very meaning of sci. ence to move away from appearances? Why study these appearances; and, how
can this be a science? While it is true that science studies things as they rea!fy are,
this is not at all how things appear to us as themselves. But isn't it also true that
things appear as what they are to us and that we know fully well the difference
between a thing's appearance as itself and its "real' nature? Take a cube of sugar.
While looking at it from an angle, it appears to us optically distorted, while we
know fully well that it is a cube. We do not see a cube, to be very precise, and yet
we say, "it is a cube of sugar," even if it is not a cube in the exact sense of geometry.
What kind of a difference is this? It is a difference that we are fully aware of
both in our everyday lives as well as in our potential occupations as scientists,
namely that-to use a terminology made famous by Thomas Nagel--between
the first person perspective and the third person perspective, our personal, individual
viewpoint on the one hand and that from which science is being carried out, the
"view from nowhere," on the other. 4 The "viewpoint" of the scientist is not supposed to contain any viewpoint at all. And as Nagel's famous phrase indicates, a
"view from nowhere" is a paradoxical thing, a standpoint without a standpoint.
And yet, we privilege this standpoint over that of our personal one all the time,
not only as scientists. We try to be "objective." We do not attribute any real
value, scientific (or political, or otherwise) to utterances relative to a subject. But
is this fair? Hence, instead of arguing why phenomenology is a science, one can

3

Following the Kantian reminder that "it is not an improvement but a deformation of the
sciences when their boundaries are allowed to run over into one another" (Critique of Pure ReasM,
B VIII, Guyer I Wood trans.).
4

Though I take this terminological distinction from Nagel, I am using it not it in any sense
peculiar to his The View from Nowhere, but rather in that in which it has become commonplace in
contemporary Philosophy of Mind.
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ask the opposite, critical question: what nght does the third person perspective
have to do what it does, or pretend to do? How can this be justified if it really is a
paradoxical enterprise to begin with? It is not my intention here to criticize the
sciences, nor did any serious phenomenologist ever doubt the dignity and importance of the sciences, as witnessed in Husserl's famous last book, the Crisis of
European Sdences, which precisely lamented the loss of science's original intentions. However, just as one questions the legitimacy of the ftrst person perspective, one might as well tum the tables and question that of the third person perspective.
This polemic will not help us further. But it has become clear that phenomenology purports to be a study of this first person perspective. It is, more precisely, a science of the ftrst person perspective, something that Nagel envisions
but at the same time declares not be in existence yet. This is a statement that
makes phenomenologists wince. For this is precisely what phenomenology had
been doing for nearly a century! 5 So again, how can it be called a science? And
what kind of a science is it? We know this much so far: phenomenology is a science that studies things as they are in themselves, not as they "really are", and
this "in themselves" is how they appear to me in my first person perspective, as
opposed to an account from the third person perspective (disregarding the problems with it). Phenomenology pays attention to things as they appear or give
themselves, and this is precisely as what they are in the natural attitude. There is no
being behind the appearances, but the appearances are the things themselves. But
the shift from things as they "really" are to what they are "themselves" opens up
a whole new wealth of experience for the phenomenological scientist. For, how
do these things appear to us? Is this really such a simple matter?
Let us take the famous example of Husserl's, rehearsed over and over again
to clarify the simple but fascinating meaning of phenomenology and its peculiar
description: the perceptual object. We see the object, undoubtedly the object itself, and undoubtedly it exists. It is no mere appearance or representation of
something that is otherwise independent of my perceptual faculties. But its being
is somehow given to me. I see the pulpit with the front side facing me and the
backside hidden. When I turn it around, the opposite is the case: the back side is
now the front side. Perceptual objects, hence, give themselves perspectivally, in
"adumbrations". And, I can only perceive this object (the pulpit) in its entirety by
walking around it, touching it etc. To the object as it gives itself corresponds
5

I am not claiming to do justice to Nagel's positive efforts here. My point is only that, I believe, Nagel is a kindred spirit with phenomenology, though his own interests lie in a different
direction (the issue of qualia).
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someone, in this case an embodied agent, to whom this object gives itself, to
whom it appears. This structure is true for all creatures, who have perception, as
we can easily see through a quick exercise Husserl calls "eidetic variation." It is
valid neither only for a particular creature, such as a human being, nor merely a
particular perceptual object. Perception as such has the structure of givenness-as
and appearance-for. Even God, Husser! famously says, if he has perception,
would not see in any other way than perspectivally. 6 This claim is wholly independent of a scientific account of the manner in which eyes function or how a
certain species has developed its perceptual apparatus in the course of evolution.
It is a claim about a certain manner in which objects give themselves as themselves. Hence, perception is a genuine topic of phenomenology in the way specified before; a topic, which can be further differentiated into seeing, hearing etc.;
another would be memory, another imagination, etc. The list can be expanded
almost endlessly into other areas where the founder of phenomenology himself
had not forayed.
Hence, we can now give a ftrst definition of phenomenology: it is an eidetic
science of the ftrst person perspective. It studies things in their manner of appearance or their manner of givenness, with no limit in principle as to what can
count as thing or matter. It studies them precisely in the way they appear to us in
our everyday lives, in the natural attitude, but studies them in the way that we,
living in the natural attitude, do not realize. And this is the important point: for,
paradoxically, this dimension of the natural attitude is hidden to us in the natural
attitude. Being in the natural attitude, we don't know that we are in the natural
attitude; this is precisely its basic trait. I take it and its "general thesis," that the
world exists (independent of my experiencing it), for granted Hence, by practicing epochi from the natural attitude and turning back on the natural attitude itself,
we come to see these things of the natural attitude in a way never seen before. It
does not give us an "objective" account, but in phenomenological description we
focus on and dig deeper into the ways and manners of the natural attitude, uncovering things we normally take for granted, for instance, the mechanisms by
which the most normal and common relation to the world occurs: perception. In
this sense, phenomenology is the science of things taken for granted (Wissenschtifi
der Se!bstverstandlichkeiten). This type of viewpoint and the science that follows
from it is impossible from the standpoint of the natural attitude itself.

6

This brief discussion is a statement of Husserl's transcendental idealism. A more detailed
account, comparing Husserl's idealism with that of Kant, can be found in my "From Being to
Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the :Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and
Husser!," in: International Journal ofPhilosophital Studies 15/3 (2007), pp. 367-394.

14

SEBASTIAN LUFI

D91

As mentioned, Husser! inststs that this science is "rigorous," by which he
means eidetic-a science of essences (like mathematics). It is a science, unlike the
sciences from the third person perspective, but, Husser! claims, just as rigorous
as the eidetic sciences arithmetic and geometry. A science of the first person perspective that is just as rigorous as mathematics! To be sure, the term "eidetic" has
been criticized in the Phenomenological Movement and beyond. Since I do not
wish to restrict this account of phenomenology to Husser!, let us use a different
terminology. Phenomenology can also be called an a priori science of the first person perspective, which attempts to determine, as "a prior!' says in Kant, necessary
and universal traits, in this case of appearances of or givennesses for an experiencing agent, whoever this may be. So instead of construing science as "objective" as opposed to "subjective" opinions, phenomenology claims that there can
be necessary and universal claims both on the side of science in the ordinary
sense of the term-from the third person perspective-as well as of the first
person perspective. This undercuts the traditional distinction between subjective
and objective, thereby ceasing to privilege the latter.
This defmition, I claim, holds generally valid for phenomenology as such. It
captures also something like Heidegger's fundamental ontology of Dasein. 'W'hen
Heidegger speaks of "Dasein" instead of "subjectivity" or "consciousness," he
does not mean a specifically human creature on planet Earth, but any being that is
defined by its structures of care, understanding, and through its fmitude and being-toward-death. Hence-and this is often misunderstood when talking about
Heidegger--even the existential category of "mineness" (jemeinigkeil) is an a priori
existential category, an E:x:isten:<jal. The same goes for Scheler's account of emotions and Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of embodied existence. They all have attempted to describe necessary and universal traits of first person experience of
being, matters, things, in the parlance of phenomenology. 7
But this has led us already implicitly to the transcendental dimension of phenomenology, and this will be the next and fmal step. Using the term "a prior!'
already has brought us into Kantian territory, and deliberately so. So allow me a
quick excursion into Kant's transcendental project. Kant's Copernican Revolution begins, as is well known, with the thought experiment to imagine "that the
objects must conform to our cognition" rather than the other way around. Kant
7

Hence, I would characterize the difference between these thinkers not so much with respect to different phenomena they describe, but instead concerning that which they consider to
be the most fondamental phenomenon, i.e., something that Husser! himself might have overlooked.
But this type of discussion, is my point, already takes place within the sphere of phenomenology.
Hence, these differences do not in any case question their conunitment to phenomenology in the
most basic definition expounded above.
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simply wants to see what happens if we look at what we lay into things, rather
than the objects impressing something on us like a signet-ring. There is something about us that makes for the fact that objects can be experienced in the first
place. So the assumed fact, the factum, is that objects exist, as well as a pnori cognition about them, and Kant wants to fmd out what makes this factum possible.
This is the transcendental question: how is the factum possible, or what is its condition of possibility? This is, most fundamentally, (a) the fact that our sensibility
of space and time is the condition of the possibility to experience things in space
and time, and (b) the categories of the understanding. We know of objects only
as they are given to us, not as what they might really be, i.e., outside from our experiencing them. Therefore, we must limit our knowledge claims to objects as
they appear to us, not as they really are. All knowledge claims, even if they are a
tlriori (and some are), must limit themselves to phainomena, not noumena. God,
freedom, and immortality are such noumena. We can only have cognition with respect to phainomena, objects as they are given to our sensibility, as they appear to
us. All of this can be summarized in Kant's notion of transcendental idealism: all
our knowledge claims are with respect to objects of experience, and beyond that
nothing is given, and if it is not given, we cannot make any claims about them
(other than skewed ones).
Back to phenomenology. One thing that irked most phenomenologists, beginning with Hegel (if I may be permitted to call him a phenomenologistQ, was
the dualism between appearance and being, of which we can have no experience.
If we have no experience of objects existing outside of their realm of appearing
to us, how can we even know about them? The dualism is highly problematic.
Clearly, there exist only things as they are given, nothing beyond that. Husser!
says this quite explicitly in texts, where he gives a "proof' of transcendental idealism. He says apodictically, and this is his claim of transcendental idealism, of
which he says in a late text that he has "nothing to rescind": 8 "to the essence of
being belongs its being-able-to-be-given". 9 But is not such a claim just a preposterous as Kant's in the opposite direction, at least as Kant appears implausible
from the standpoint of the phenomenologist? Does this not push Husser! into
an absolute idealism that Kant was so careful to avoid? Could we not understand
Kant's transcendental idealism as a form of humility that simply wants to respect

8

This statement is from Husserl's "Nachwort zu meinen !den?' (Post-Script to my Ideas),

Husseraana V, here p. 151.
9

I am referring here to a body of texts in which Husser! works out a specific "proof' for
transcendental idealism, cf. Husserliana XXXVI. T11e quotation above is from p. 32 of this volume. The original reads: "Zum Wesen des Seins geh6rt Gegeben-sein-Ki:innen [... ]."
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the limits of our capacities? How can we be certain that being is nothing beyond
that, being-given; that it belongs to the essence of being to be given? How can
Husser! say such a thing and what does it mean?
I allege that the quoted phrase expresses exactly what I here wish to call the
"transcendental dimension" of phenomenology. First of all, contrary to Kant,
this dimension seems to collapse the distinction between phainomena and noumena.
There are only phainomena, only appearances-of and givennesses-to. Now this
seems like a claim that certainly a "realist" would deny, to reduce being to beinggiven. Wouldn't this open the door to an unscientific subjectivism, because things
certainly appear differently to different people? Reducing being to appearance
would eliminate all objective knowledge claims. But we have already seen that this
opposition between objective and subjective is questionable.
But let us further see what this claim can mean. First of all, to sav that "to the
'
essence of being belongs its being-able-to-be-given" does not mean that all being
is at all times given. It only claims tlus: All being, if it really exists, must potentially be able to give itself; there is no being outside of the potentiality of givenness.
If it exists, it must be able to come to appearance at least potentially, even if this
potentiality might not be a human potentiality. For instance, there are certain
mathematical phenomena of which mathematicians can apparently prove that
they cannot be proven. But this doesn't mean that the proof doesn't exist! It just
exceeds human capacities of comprehension. Hence, being is, or at least can be,
experienced, and in this case, it is experienced in the way it appears or gives itself-to someone. Something is experienced, even if this turns out to be a "mere appearance," calling to nlind Heidegger's example of somebody appearing in a certain colored light (as red) and therefore only appearing ill. 10 But as we already have
seen, for phenomenology, "mere" appearance and "real being" are alternatives
that are not mutually exclusive.
But to fully understand this claim regarding being as being-given, we need to
inquire into the natu111 of this claim. Is it an ontological claim? And I think here is
where people critical of this "transcendental-idealistic" sense of phenomenology
make the fundamental error: it is nothing like a claim about being, about things as
they 111alfy a111. Indeed, when Husser! makes these claims as to phenomenology as
transcendental idealism, he is speaking from the standpoint of the epochi. The
claim is metaphysically and ontologically neutral. As such, he is speaking from the
standpoint of the first person, not from that of the natural attitude or any other
science. To insist on realism with respect to being is to be caught up in the natu-

lO

Sei" u"d Zeit (fubingen: Niemeyer, 1986), pp. 30 f.
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ral attitude, which does not acknowledge that we can only speak about being
from the first person perspective insofar as it is given to us. To insist on the exclusiveness of the third person perspective is epistemologically naive. But phenomenology claims to say nothing about the true nature of being, whatever that
may be. It only emphasizes the fact that we, as experiencing agents, are bound to
a certain standpoint, and this means, being necessarily gives itself or appears to us.
And it is neither a form of Berkeleyan idealism that claims somehow that we create representations out of our own minds (raising the specter of solipsism) .11
Things, matters themselves give themselves, because this is how they are--to us
and any other creature that has its own ftrst person standpoint. The fact that
things have the potential to appear takes nothing away from their "true being"
that science wants to attain. If anything, it adds an aspect that will forever escape
the sciences of the third person perspective. Hence, the phenomenological
meaning of "transcendental," if we retain the language of "condition of possibility," is simply this: the condition of the possibility of any experience of being is
that tt is fust of all somehow given, which does nothing other than to locate
Kant's claim as to clarifying the "conditions of the possibility" on the lowest possible level: things given in their ordinary lifeworldly meaning. Phenomenology
does nothing other than draw attention to this very fact, and this is significant
because this fact is acknowledged neither in the natural attitude nor in the sciences, which investigate being from a standpoint that precisely tries to get away
from the subjective-relative. Givenness is the prriteron pros hemas, and phenomenology wants to do nothing but restore the meaning of this prriteron and pay tribute to its proper sense, which is to describe it in all of its manners and details.
To summarize, the transcendental dimension of phenomenology is the
commitment to construe being as being-given. It does not claim that we lay
something into the objects prior to our knowledge of them, as Kant sees it. To
the contrary, as the Husserlian term "constitution" indicates (unfortunately, a
misleading term), things constitute themselves in experience, that is, there is a correlation of givenness-of and appearance-to, and this is the condition of the possibility of the experience of the world, any world Nor does it question in any way
the "true nature" of being and the quest to attain it Another, and perhaps more
familiar way of saying this is that phenomenology restricts itself to the sphere of
intentionality, intentional immanence, where any questions as to the nature of
11

In the same breath that Bussed has argued for this version of transcendental idealism, he
has emphasized that it is not a form of solipsism but instead entails the dimension of intersubjectivity. I can, however, only hint at the thorny issue of intersubjectivity, which was tackled in such
different manners by the main representatives of phenomenology.
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that being, which is experienced, and that agent, who experiences, are bracketed.
It is an acknowledgment of the irreducibility of the first person perspective, but
more than that, it is a whole new form of science, which hitherto has not existed:
an a priori, transcendental science of the first person perspective, which investigates the manners and intricacies of being as it gives itsel£ This is, I believe, the
simplest but also most general meaning of phenomenology and it is, I also believe, the eidetic invariant that any phenomenologist would have to agree upon, if
they are in any remote way doing phenomo-1ogy, even if they might have abandoned terms such as intentionality, consciousness or subjectivity, terms that were
for Husser! all provisional and inadequate notions anyway.
As such, although the definition is simple, it is by no means trivial. It is not
trivial because it opens up a viewpoint on the world in intricacies never described
before: on the world as a world of meaning, which we take so much for granted
that we always already leap over it. Phenomenology has given philosophy a new
sense of wonder, of thaumdt!in, about things that were never things or matters,
Sachen worth our attention, to begin with. Its claim is as grandiose as, in its actual
descriptive work, immensely humble. In this description, phenomenology for the
first time uncovers-we might daringly say "creates"-these things and brings
them before consciousness to contemplate them in their simple but complex
beauty. It is in this sense not inappropriate to compare phenomenology to art. I
would argue that its closest proximity is to impressionism. To make one last comparison with the sciences, phenomenology has invented the microscope for the
world of the ftrst person perspective, the natural attitude and the life-world in
which it lives. This is its lasting achievement: to never cease to pay attention to
the transcendental dimension of life itse!f. 12
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